Am Mittwoch 14. März 2018 gibt Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak von der Yale University einen Vortrag zum Thema "The Economics of Enforcement". Analysiert werden Politikinstrumente zur Regulierung von Überfischung im Pazifik.
Der Vortrag findet von 16.30-18.00 Uhr auf der WU statt: Campus WU, Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Gebäude TC, Erdgeschoß, Raum TC.0.01 ERSTE. Das Seminar ist eine Zusammenarbeit vom Department of Economics und dem Institute for Markets and Strategy.
Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak(Yale University)
"The Economics of Enforcement"
Abstract: Curbing undesirable behaviors through regulation is difficult when regulated agents react in unanticipated ways to circumvent enforcement. When enforcement capacity is limited, regulators rely on indirect methods like information campaigns to encourage compliance with socially desirable actions. We evaluate attempts to reduce over-fishing of the critically endangered Pacific hake by either (a) monitoring and penalizing vendors that sell illegal fish during a ban or (b) discouraging consumers from purchasing hake during the ban. Vendors attempt to circumvent the ban through hidden sales and other means, which we track using secret shoppers. Instituting random monitoring visits are much more effective in curbing hake sales by limiting such cheating, than visits that occur on a predictable schedule. Monitoring at higher frequency (designed to limit spatial and temporal displacement of illegal sales) backfires, because targeted agents learn faster, and cheat more effectively. Details of enforcement policy design are therefore crucial in determining the sustained, longer-term effects of enforcement.